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JAIME DAWES*

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island:
Clarification and More Confusion on
the Notice Issue
ABSTRACT
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the United States Supreme Court
had an opportunity to provide guidanceas to what effect notice of
limitationson development of propertyprior to acquisitionshould
have on a takings claim. The clarification was, however, not as
significantas anticipated.Although the Court decided that notice
of restrictionsat the time of acquisitionwill not necessarily bar a
takings claim, it chose not to provide many definitive answers.
Notice and transfer of title are apparently relevant considerations
in a takingsanalysis,but exactly how relevantremains unclear.For
this reason,Palazzolo, though providing some degree ofguidance,
will likely perpetuate confusion and inconsistency in state and
lowerfederal courts confronted with notice issues.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently decided a takings case
that many hoped would provide much needed guidance regarding takings
claims brought by those who acquire property with notice of existing or
impending restrictions.' Until the recent case of Palazzolov. Rhode Island,the
Supreme Court had hardly addressed the so-called "notice issue" that has
frequently arisen in state and lower federal courts. In the absence of
definitive direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts treated
preexisting limitations in different ways, many finding notice to defeat an
otherwise potentially successful claim for just compensation.
Much of the confusion exhibited by state and lower federal court
cases decided before Palazzolo stems from the lack of a consistent
application of two distinct tests established by the Supreme Court or from
misapplication of one of the two tests. Under a rule articulated in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,2 a regulation that denies "all economically
beneficial or productive use of land" is regarded as having essentially the

* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A. Psychology, New
Mexico State University.
1. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
2. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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same effect as a physical appropriation3 and consequently requires
compensation irrespective of the public interest served by the regulation.4
In such circumstances, a taking will be defeated only if the limitation was
not "newly legislated or decreed" but was instead grounded in
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance." When
an owner cannot allege full deprivation of economically beneficial use, a
regulatory taking may nonetheless be established under a second test
promulgated by the Supreme Court in PennCentralTransportationCo. v. City
of New York.6 Under this ad hoc test, the reviewing court should consider
"the economic impact of the regulation.. .the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.. .[and] the
7
character of the governmental action."
Despite the apparent dichotomy created by the Supreme Court,
prior to Palazzolo, the Lucas and Penn Central tests were frequently
commingled in the decisions of state and lower federal courts addressing
post-regulation acquisition, often allowing for the application of a "notice
defense." The defense also emerged in cases applying only one of the two
tests. The investment-backed expectations prong of the PennCentraltest was
given heightened or predominate significance. Courts found owners
acquiring property following enactment of regulations to have "notice,"
defeating investment-backed expectations and the takings claim itself. At
times, knowledge of the likelihood of future regulation at the time of
acquisition was found to create such notice. Moreover, some state and lower
federal courts held that regulations in existence at the time of purchase or
acquisition are "background principles" barring takings claims alleging
deprivation of all economically beneficial use, notwithstanding the
language in Lucas indicating that a background principle cannot be "newly
legislated or decreed." 8 In addition to misapplying the Lucas and Penn
Centraltests, state and lower federal courts also tended to ignore a Supreme
Court decision in which the Court apparently rejected the notice defense.9
Palazzolo is a fairly typical example of the cases creating this
confusion. Palazzolo acquired the property at issue through dissolution of

3. The Supreme Court has held that any permanent physical occupation establishes a
taking, regardless of the important public interest that may be served by the occupation. See,
e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982).
4. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-17.
5.

Id. at 1029.

6. 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
7. Id. at 124.

8. Id. at 1029.
9.

See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 484 U.S. 825,833 n.2 (1987).
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a corporation after the limiting regulations were already in place.' ° After
applications to fill the property-which can be described as "salt marsh
subject to tidal flooding""-were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse
condemnation action in Rhode Island state court.12 He alleged that the
wetlands regulations had deprived him of all economically beneficial use
of the property without compensation, in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 3 The Rhode Island Supreme Court eventually
heard the case 4 and held that it was not ripe for judicial review."5 In the
alternative, the court found that the preexistence of the wetlands regulation
defeated Palazzolo's claim, regardless of whether the categorical or partial
takings formulation was used. 6
In the U.S. Supreme Court, Palazzolo's Lucas-based claim did not
hold up due to the undisputed evidence that he would be permitted to
build at least one house on the upland portion of his land; that potential
development was expected to yield a land value of about $200,000.17
However, in dicta, the Court noted that "if a iestrictive regulation is in place
at the time of transfer, the initial owner nonetheless transfers full rights"
since "a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent
compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State's
law by mere virtue of the passage of title." 8 The Court subsequently
decided that Palazzolo might have a claim under the factors outlined in
Penn Central and remanded to a lower court for application of that test.
Instrumental to this decision was the court's holding that a partial takings
claim "is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the
effective date of the state-imposed restriction." 9 In rejecting notice as a
categorical bar to a takings claim under either the categorical or partial
formulation, the Court appeared more concerned with giving the state too
much power to define property rights and potentially depriving the Takings
Clause of significance 0 than with articulating dear rules regarding the
effect of notice in future takings cases.

10. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614 (2001). The regulations were,
however, enacted after the corporation formed by Palazzolo and others purchased the
property. See id.
11. Id. at 613.
12. Id. at 615.
13. Id. Palazzolo sought $3,150,000 in damages based on the estimated value of a
proposed 74-lot residential subdivision. Id. at 616.
14. See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).

15. Id.at 714.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 715-17.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,630-32 (2001).
Id.at 629-30.
Id. at630.
See id. at 626-28.
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Although Palazzolocan hardly be described as clarifying the notice
issue, it did provide a few definitive answers. Transfer of title following
enactment of a law or regulation that would require payment of just
compensation in order to be constitutional will not necessarily bar a takings
claim. However, notice and transfer of title are apparently relevant in the
Penn Centralanalysis and are potentially important in the per se context.2
Those who acquire property subject to existing limitations or regulation will
have a chance to realize just compensation. How good that chance will be,
however, is an open question. Thus, the Court's decision, though providing
some degree of guidance, will likely perpetuate existing confusion and
inconsistency in state and lower federal courts.
BACKGROUND: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court first recognized regulatory takings in
PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon.' In that case, Justice Holmes voiced the oftcited proposition that while "government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every.. .change in the general law," a regulation may still go "too far"
and constitute a taking.' Unfortunately, the opinion did not offer much
more than a quotable statement. When a regulation goes "too far" was not
clearly defined.24 Moreover, a clear rule regarding the regulatory takings
analysis did not surface due to virtual silence on the part of the Supreme
Court in the years following Pennsylvania Coal, leaving regulatory takings
jurisprudence in the hands of state and lower federal courts. Perhaps the
only consistency in the early regulatory takings decisions of the lower
courts was the tendency not to find a taking.'
Over fifty years after PennsylvaniaCoal,the Supreme Court decided
the case of Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York.26 In Penn
Central, the Court admitted that it had been "unable to develop any set
formula for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."27 It

21. See id. at 629-30.
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. Id. at 415.
24. The Court described the issue as a "question of degree" that could not "be disposed
of by general propositions." Id. at 416.
25. See David L. Callies, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523,525 (1999) (stating that in the period of
Supreme Court silence, state and lower federal courts eroded regulatory takings to the point
that they were "virtually moribund").
26. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
27. Id. at 124.
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described the required analysis as involving "ad hoc factual inquiries"' but
nonetheless outlined "several factors that have particular significance": (1)
"the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations," and (3) "the character of the governmental action."'
In KaiserAetna v. United States,3 a small change in wording set the
stage for an objective inquiry into investment-backed expectations. When
citing the Penn Centraltest, the Court did not refer to "distinct" investmentbacked expectations, but to "reasonable" investment-backed expectations.31
Whether intended to change the standard or not, the objective inquiry has
frequently been utilized by state and lower federal courts,32 often employed
to create rules regarding the effect of "notice" on takings claims.'
In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co.,' the Court first addressed notice
issues and appeared to adopt the notice defense. The plaintiff company in
that case was an inventor, developer, and producer of pesticides. The case
challenged data consideration and disclosure provisions of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)35 as violating the
Takings Clause.' Originally, the Act was predominately a licensing and
labeling statute that required submission of certain types of data.37 In 1972,
the Act was amended to allow the submitter of data to protect portions of

28. Id.
29. Id. at 124.
30. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
31. See id. at 175.
32. See, e.g., Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp 463,469 (E.D. Cal. 1984) ("In order
for an expectation to be entitled to the law's protection, it must be more than simply
'investment-backed'; it must be reasonable.");Price v.City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582 (5th
Cir. 1983) ("By their very nature such inoperable junk vehicles do not embody reasonable,
investment-backed expectations.").
33. See, e.g., East Cape May Assocs. v. New Jersey, 693 A.2d 114, 120 (N.J. App. 1997)
("Whether or not expectations are considered reasonable will depend to a significant extent
on whether the property owner had notice in advance of its investment decision that the
govermental regulations which are alleged to constitute the taking had been or would be
enacted."); Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219,1230 (9th Cir. 1998) (indicating that
the plaintiffs could not have had a reasonable expectation of being able to develop their
property without having to comply with state law in effect at the time); Bowles v. United
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 51 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (evaluating whether the plaintiff's expectations were
objectively reasonable by considering whether the plaintiff "or someone similarly situated"
would have had notice of the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers); Furey v. City of
Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463,469 (E.D. Cal. 1984) (expectations must be reasonable, meaning
"at least consistent with the law in force at the time of the formation of the expectation").
34. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
35. 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1994).
36.
37.

Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998.
Id.at 991.
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the data by designating them as trade secrets.- A 1978 amendment to
FIFRA eliminated this provision and allowed for disclosure of health,
safety, and environmental data to "qualified requesters" even if that data
contained trade secrets. 9
In addressing the takings claim, the Court divided its analysis of
investment-backed expectations based on the evolution of FIFRA. The Court
first considered data submitted to the EPA following the effective date of
the 1978 Amendments to FIFRA. It concluded that Monsanto could not have
had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that the information would
be kept confidential except as required by the statute.' The company could
"hardly argue that its reasonable investment-backed expectations are
disturbed when the EPA acts to use or disclose the data in a manner that
was authorized by law atthe time of the submission."4 The Court similarly
relied on the statutory scheme when addressing data submitted between the
years of 1972 and 1978. During that time period, the Act gave companies an
opportunity to protect trade secrets from disclosure and therefore allowed
for reasonable investment-backed expectations that could support a takings
claim.4 2
The Court took a more interesting approach when it considered
data submitted prior to 1972, when FIFRA was silent on use and disclosure
of data submitted. It held that, "absent an express promise, Monsanto had
no reasonable investment-backed expectation that its information would
remain inviolate in the hands of the EPA."4 3 According to the court, "[i]n an
industry that long has been the focus of great public concern and significant
government regulation, the possibility was substantial that the Federal
Government, which had thus far taken no position on disclosure of health,
safety, and environmental data concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the
issue, would find disclosure to be in the public interest."' In light of the
extensive regulation of the industry, and the practice of using data
submitted before 1972, Monsanto could have no reasonable investmentbacked expectations.'
Even a conservative read of Monsanto leads to the conclusion that
one cannot have reasonable investment-backed expectations that do not
equate with laws currently in force and, therefore, supports the existence of
a notice defense. The portion of the opinion addressing information

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 992.
Id. at 995-96.
Id. at 1006.
Id.at 1006-07.
Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1010-11 (1984).
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1008-09.
Id. at 1009.
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submitted prior to 1972 apparently endorses the idea that constructive
notice is capable of defeating investment-backed expectations.
The Court later limited the applicability of Monsanto in a footnote
in Nollan v. California CoastalCommission.4 In Nollan, the plaintiffs leased
beachfront property with an option to purchase, conditioned on their
promise to replace a bungalow on the property. In order to replace the
bungalow, the plaintiffs had to obtain a permit from the California Coastal
Commission. The Nollans acquired the property after the Commission had
begun to implement a policy of conditioning permits for rebuilding houses
on the transfer of easements.' The Commission applied this policy to the
Nollans and accordingly conditioned the grant of the permit on the
surrender of an easement to be used as a public pathway. The Nollans then
challenged the condition under the takings clause.49 In a footnote, the
Supreme Court declared that the Nollans' rights were not affected by
acquisition following implementation of the Commission's policy: "So long
as the Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the
easement without compensating them, the prior owners must be
understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the
lot."' In so concluding, the Court rejected Justice Brennan's attempt to use
Monsanto, distinguishing that case based on the fact that it dealt with
"valuable Government benefits."5 1 Consequently, Nollan now has limited,
if any, applicability in the real property context. •
Although the notice issue was addressed only briefly, the Nollan
Court ultimately held that the condition would violate the Takings Clause
in the absence of compensation. 2 The broad language in the footnote and
the holding of the case demonstrate that the Court apparently rejected the
idea that the preexistence of limiting regulations, and perhaps even actual
notice of existing regulations, would necessarily bar a takings claim.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' the Supreme Court
created a new test (and therefore a dichotomy in takings analysis) that soon
became relevant in cases raising the notice issue. The plaintiff paid $975,000
for two residential lots, intending to build two single-family homes." Two
years later, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront

46. 484 U.S. 825 (1987).
47. Id. at 828.
48. Id. at 829.

49. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 833, n.2.
Id.
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 484 U.S. 825,841-42 (1987).
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1007.
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Management Act,' which prevented the plaintiff from building permanent
habitable structures on the land.' Upon review of the case, the Supreme
Court again noted that it had "generally eschewed any set formula" for
determining when a regulation results in a taking, but then stated that it
had, "described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced
in support of the restraint."'7 The first category identified was physical
takings, in which compensation is required "no matter how minute the
"' The
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it.
second category described involves regulations denying "all economically
beneficial or productive use of the land."' According to the Court, "total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the
equivalent of a physical appropriation. " ' °
Although the Court suggested that the second category had always
been recognized, its choice to single out regulations that deny all
economically beneficial use does not follow directly from the cases cited.6
Thus, the case is best characterized as creating a new category of "per se"
takings that will not require application of the Penn Centraltest. The Court
ultimately left no doubt regarding its new formulation in stating that "when
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."62 However, the Court
subsequently qualified the statement in declaring, "where the State seeks
to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use,

55.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (West Supp. 2001).

56. Lucas, 50 U.S. at 1007.
57. Id. at 1015.
58.

Id.

59. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1015 (1992).
60. Id. at 1017.
61. For example, the Court quoted from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)-the Fifth Amendment is violated when a regulation "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1016 (emphasis added in Lucas). This statement appears to indicate only that deprivation
of economically viable use is required if a regulation advances legitimate state interests. It
does not seem to support the proposition that a regulation that denies all economically
beneficial use is a per se taking. Both dissenting opinions argued that the Court has never

recognized a special form of taking when regulations deprive all economically beneficial use.
See id. at 1047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("when the government regulation prevents the

owner from any economically valuable use, the private interest is unquestionably substantial,
but we have never before held that no public interest can outweigh it"); id. at 1062-63
(Stevens, J., dissenting), ("Although in dicta we have sometimes recited that a law 'effects a
taking if it denies an owner economically viable use of his land,' our rulingshave rejected such
an absolute position.") (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
62. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
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we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the interests were not part of his title to begin with."6 It
accordingly decided that a limitation depriving a landowner of all
economically beneficial use "cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation) but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership.""
STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS ON PENN CENTRAL,
LUCAS, NOLLAN, AND NOTICE
Although the Court in Lucas left the Penn Central test unaltered,
state and lower federal courts have not consistently interpreted PennCentral
and Lucas as providing distinct tests. Various components of the two tests
have been combined or disregarded in cases involving notice problems.
Both the expectations prong of Penn Centraland the background principles
exception of Lucas have been applied so as to make notice, sometimes even
constructive notice, of regulations a highly relevant or entirely
determinative factor in the takings analysis. Heightened emphasis has been
placed on the investment-backed expectations inquiry of Penn Central,and
the background principles exceptionhasbeen extended beyond its intended
scope. Furthermore, the expectations analysis has been applied in the
categorical takings analysis, despite the Supreme Court's failure to identify
reasonable investment-backed expectations as a relevant factor in
categorical takings cases. Moreover, decisions applying notice as a bar have
generally ignored the only definitive Supreme Court discussion on the
matter-the Nollan footnote.65

63. Id. at 1027.
64. Id. at 1029.
65. Not all courts have ignored the case. See, e.g., East Cape May Assocs. v. State, 693
A.2d 114,120 (N.J. App. Div. 1997) (stating that the plaintiff was "entitled to assert whatever
developmental rights its predecessors would have had, but also indicating that the
reasonableness of expectations will depend on whether the plaintiff had notice of existing or
impending regulations). A few courts have even cited Nollan as potentially undermining the
appropriateness of a notice defense. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 50-51 &
n.15 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (noting that the United States Claims Court had "applied the 'notice'
defense as an independent basis to deny a wetlands takings claim," but citing the Nollan
footnote and describingits impact as limiting the defense to situations involving "a'voluntary
exchange' between the government and private entities"); Store Safe Redlands Assocs. v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726,735 (Fed. C. 1996) (citing Nolan in support of the proposition
that an "argument that plaintiff cannot predicate a taking on regulatory actions predating its
purchase of the property is not a logical conclusion based on precedent").
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Significant confusion lies in the tendency of some courts to conflate
the Penn Centraland Lucas analyses.' This has frequently occurred through
importation of the investment-backed expectations prong into Lucas-based
claims.67 For example, in Good v. United States," the Federal Circuit declared,
"the Supreme Court in Lucasdid not mean to eliminate the requirement that
reasonable, investment-backed expectations establish a taking."' The per
se takings recognized in Lucas were instead categorical only in the sense
that they are "compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint."' According to the court, the
Supreme Court intended to continue to require a showing of interference
with reasonable investment backed-expectations but simply did not discuss
expectations in Lucas because the requirement was clearly satisfied in that
case.' It consequently held that "[rleasonable investment-backed
expectations are an element of every regulatory takings case."'
Other courts have not simply applied expectations as an additional
factor in the Lucas analysis but have gone a step further in equating
investment-backed expectations with the background principles referred to
in Lucas. This was the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in Outdoor
Graphics,Inc. v. City of Burlington.' In that case, the court cited Lucas for the
proposition that "even where the state enacts a regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, it has no duty to compensate if the

66. See, e.g., Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (describing the
character of the governmental action prong of Penn Central as examining the restriction
"under the lens of state nuisance law"); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,
1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("there has been a regulatory taking if (1) there was a denial of
economically viable use of the property as a result of the regulatory imposition; (2) the
property owner had distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) it was an interest vested
in the owner, as a matter of state property law, and not within the power of the state to
regulate under common law nuisance doctrine"); Kelly v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 855
P.2d 1027, 1034 (Nev. 1993) (employing the three Penn Central factors as means to decide
whether there was a deprivation of all economically beneficial use).
67. See, e.g., Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540,542 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
("To establish his claim of a compensable regulatory 'total' taking of his property, appellee
also was required to demonstrate that the permit denial interfered with his reasonable,
distinct investment-backed expectations, held at the time he purchased the property.);
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 628, 633 (S.C. 2000) (Investment backed
expectations were not discussed in Lucas because "there was no question David Lucas had
distinct investment-backed expectations.").
68. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
69. Id.
at 1361.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 103 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1996).
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proscribed use interests were not part of the owner's title to begin with."74
The Court then described the evaluation of whether the landowner's
"bundle of rights previously included the right to engage in the restricted
activity" as involving an inquiry into "the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the landowner at the time of his acquisition of, or capital
expenditure on, the property in question."'
Other courts have tended to make notice dispositive in either the
Penn Centralanalysis using reasonable investment-backed expectations, or
in the Lucas analysis using background principles of state property or
nuisance law. For instance, in Gazza v. New York Departmentof Environmental
m the New York Court of Appeals found notice of existing
Conservation,'
limitations to determine the outcome. In that case, the plaintiff brought a
takings claim based on the denial of his application to fill tidal wetlands.
The legislation requiring approval prior to filling was in place at the time
the plaintiff acquired the property.' The court, citing Lucas, concluded that
"the purchase of a 'bundle of rights' necessarily includes the acquisition of
a bundle of limitations. " '8 Although a prior owner may have been able to
bring a successful action for compensation, "once taken, those property
interests are no longer owned by the private owner and may not be sold by
such party."'
A similar analysis has been applied when a new owner should have
been aware that restrictions would be placed on the land in the future. For
example, in Good v. United States,' the court characterized the investmentbacked expectations requirement-which it found applicable in both partial
and total takings cases-as limiting recovery of compensation to those "who
can demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on the nonexistence of the challenged regulation.""' Relying on the frequently
mentioned "windfall argument, " ' the court posited that "it is common

74. Id. at 694.
75. Id.
76. 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997).
77. Id. at 1037.
78. Id. at 1039.
79. Id.
80. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 1360 (quoting Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627,632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
82. Courts applying notice as a bar often provide similar justification. See, e.g., Creppel
v. United States, 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("One who buys property with knowledge of the
restraint assumes the risk of economic loss," making compensation a windfall since the owner
"presumably paid a discounted price."); Atlas Enters. Ltd. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 704
(1995) ("Generally when an owner buys property with notice of the restrictions upon
development of that property, he assumes the risk of economic loss, since the "market has
already discounted for the restraint."); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870,871
(N.Y. 1997) ("Any compensation received by a subsequent owner for enforcement of the very
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sense that one who buys with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of
economic loss. " 's In such circumstances, a windfall would occur if
compensation were provided because "the owner presumably paid a
discounted price for the property." 84 The court subsequently applied this
notice prohibition to the claimant who could not develop due to a restriction
in the Endangered Species Act (ESA), even though the ESA was not in
existence at the time he purchased the property. Pointing to the "regulatory
climate" present at the time the claimant acquired title, "rising
environmental awareness," and "ever-tightening land use regulations," the
court held that the owner could not have had a reasonable expectation of
being able to develop his property as desired several years after acquiring
title.85 It then concluded that "the government is entitled to summary
judgment on a regulatory takings claim where the plaintiff lacked
reasonable, investment-backed expectations, even where the challenged
government action substantially reduced the value of the plaintiff's
property." ' 6
In Avenal v. United States," the court similarly found that
knowledge of the possibility of future restrictions was sufficient to
determine a regulatory takings claim. In that case, the plaintiffs leased state
water-bottom lands for the purpose of oyster propagation. They alleged that
a freshwater diversion project created poor conditions for oyster growth,
resulting in a taking." The court traced the development of the diversion
project, referring to evidence of intent to implement the diversion project as

restriction that served to abate the purchase price would amount to a windfall.").
83. Id. at 1361.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1361-62. In other words, "constructive" notice that regulations maybe enacted
in the future will suffice. Such a rule may derive from Monsanto and potentially makes the
notice defense applicable even when the regulations at issue were enacted after acquisition
of the property. Good is not the only case applying the notice defense even when the
regulations at issue were not in effect at the time of purchase. Other courts have similarly
relied on the "regulatory climate" to deny takings claims. See, e.g., District Intown Props. Ltd.
P'ship v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874,884 (D.C. App. 1999) ("Businesses that operate in
an industry with a history of regulation have no reasonable expectation that regulation will
not be strengthened to achieve legislative ends."); Mock v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 623 A.2d 940
(Pa. 1993) ("the Mocks could not reasonably expect to develop their land free from
government regulation because it is riparian land, which has been subject to regulation for
centuries"). But see Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 86,88 (Fed. Cl. 1992) ("Plaintiffs
voluntarily operate in a regulated industry but that is not dispositive of all ad hoc takings
analysis.").
86. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355,1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (granting the summary
judgment and stating that the plaintiff's "lack of reasonable investment-backed expectations
defeats his takings claim as a matter of law").
87. 100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
88. Id. at 936.
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far back as 1900.' Based on this history, the court declared that the plaintiffs
could not "insist on a guarantee of non-interference by government when
they well knew or should have known that, in response to widely-shared
public concerns, including concerns of the oystering industry itself,
government actions were being planned."'° Since the plan had been proposed
many years before and was "actively being pursued by state and federal
agencies" beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, the plaintiffs, who acquired
their leases in the 1970s, could not "have had reasonable investment-backed
expectations that their oyster leases would give them rights protected from
the planned freshwater diversion projects." 9
Liberal use of the background principles exception of Lucas has also
provided an opportunity to apply another variation of the notice defense.
The exception originated in the Court's statement that a restriction so severe
as to eliminate all economically beneficial use "cannot be newly legislated
or decreed (without compensation) but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership."92 Notwithstanding this
rather clear language, several courts have declined to confine the reach of
the exception to restrictions deriving from property and nuisance law,
instead extending the exception to recently enacted statutes and regulations.
A good example is City of Virginia Beach v. Bell.93 In that case, the
Virginia Supreme Court rejected an argument that background principles
are limited to restrictions that were "previously permissible under relevant
property and nuisance principles." The court saw the emphasis in Lucas
on the existing law of property and nuisance as a mere product of the facts
considered by the Court.9" Since the regulation in Lucas was enacted after
the claimants purchased the property, "the only way the State of South
Carolina could have argued that the restriction was not a taking would have
been to show that, at the time of the owners' purchase, fundamental
nuisance and property law had always prevented them from developing
their property and that the statutory restriction was simply making explicit
relevant property and nuisance law."" Because the ordinance involved in
Bell predated the plaintiff's acquisition, the court did not see a need to so
limit the background principles concept and held that the restriction

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 937 (emphasis added).
Id.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1029 (1992).
498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998).
Id. at 417-18.
Id.
Id.
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qualified as a claim-defeating background principle even though it did not
have a basis in fundamental nuisance or property law.'
In Kim v. City of New York," the New York Court of Appeals
adopted the same view and expanded the background principles exception.
Relying on Lucas, the court declared that "the threshold step in a takings
inquiry is to determine whether, in light of the 'existing rules or
understandings' of State law, plaintiffs ever possessed the property interest
they now claim has been taken by the challenged governmental action." 99
It subsequently indicated that the takings analysis would always begin with
this initial inquiry, even in cases involving an alleged physical taking.1e The
court later rejected an argument that the "'logically antecedent inquiry' into
the owner's title should be limited to those property and nuisance rules
recognized at common law, and that the statutory law should not factor into
the analysis." °1 According to the court, "[i]t would be an illogical and
incomplete inquiry if the courts were to look exclusively to common-law
principles to identify the preexisting rules of State property law, while
ignoring statutory law in force when the owner acquired title. " °2
" Such an
application "would represent a departure from the established
understanding that statutory law may trump an inconsistent principle of the
common law.""0 3 Since the plaintiffs "never owned the property interest
they claim[ed]
was taken" the court found that just compensation was not
4
required.1
In contrast to these cases, a few courts have explicitly declined to
apply notice as an insurmountable barrier to a takings claim. For example,

97. Id. at 418. Other courts have similarly concluded that statutes may provide limitations
defeating Lucas-based claims. See, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367,370-71 (Iowa 1994)
(finding that the plaintiffs took title subject to statutory restrictions and refusing to interpret
the background principle exception of Lucas to apply the state common law of property);
Grant v.S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388,391 (S.C. 1995) (concluding, based on Lucas, that
the plaintiff's takings claim was defeated since he "never had the right to fill critical area
tidelands" due to the existence of a statute in effect at the time of purchase). However, a few
courts have limited the background principle concept to limitations inherent in state property
or nuisance law. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374,1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (in order for a "law or decree" to be a background principle under Lucas it must "do
no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent
landowners.. .under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally").
98. 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
99. Id. at 314, citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
100. Id. at 314-15.
101. See id. at 315.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 318.
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in Store Safe Redlands Associates v. United States,"~ the Court of Federal
Claims criticized a rule that would prevent property owners from bringing
successful takings claims whenever the regulations involved predated the
purchase of the property, because "[u]nder such logic, Congress could pass
a law that stated that no one could build on their property," and "[aifter all
property had passed hands once, the right to build on one's property would
be lost to everyone."" i Referring to the Nollan footnote, the court asserted
that "defendant's argument that plaintiff cannot predicate a taking on
regulatory action predating its purchase of the property is not a logical
conclusion based on precedent." °7 Notwithstanding this rather strong
language, the court recognized that notice could potentially be relevant in
noting08that a "notice defense" had been recognized in a prior decision of the
court.1
The Supreme Court of Connecticut also rejected the notion that a
takings claim is categorically barred if the regulations involved preceded
the claimant's acquisition. In Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses
Agency,"° the plaintiff purchased the property subject to wetlands
regulation at a price lower than the value the land would have had if
developable."1 The court found the plaintiff capable of having reasonable
expectations even though the restricting regulations were in place at the
time of purchase. In fact, the court concluded that the trial court could have
legitimately found that "even so substantial a discount from market value
reflected nothing more than a prudent evaluation of the foreseeable
difficulties of resolving the tension between the property's listing on a
residential subdivision map and the wetlands constraints with which it was
burdened.""'
Implicit in StoreSafe andGil is the idea that notice may be a relevant
consideration but should not be conclusive. This perspective can also be
seen in some partial takings cases, which, though appearing to articulate
strong rules of notice, at least apply all three Penn Central factors. Such an

105. 35 Fed. Cl. 726 (1996).
106. Id. at 735.
107. Id.
108. Id. The court found the notice issue "moot," stating that an analysis of the effect of
the government regulation on the water rights would not be appropriate until after the scope
of the rights was determined. Id. It ultimately decided to have an evidentiary hearing to
determine the plaintiff's property rights before allowing the plaintiff to assert its takings
claim. Id. at 737.
109. 593 A.2d 1368 (Conn. 1991).
110. Id. at 1372. The plaintiff purchased the property for $50,000. There was testimony at
the trial that three months later the property would have had a value of $80,000 if "buildable."
Id.
111. Id. The court did not, however, conclusively rule on the plaintiff's expectations or
takings claim, holding that the claim was not yet ripe for review. Id. at 1374.
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approach was used in McNulty v. Town of Indialantic."2 In that case, the
federal district court asserted that one "who purchases land with notice of
statutory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if
any, reasonable investment-backed expectations of development rights
which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property rights. " 13 The,
court found that the plaintiff was "on notice that the property was subject
to restrictions" and advanced that "the burdens imposed on an individual
in a regulated environment are often simply the cost of 'living and doing
business in the civilized community."' 1 4 Nonetheless, the court also
considered the character of the government action and the economic impact
of the regulation and did not base its decision that there was not a
compensable taking solely on notice."15
Other courts have exhibited a less stringent view of notice by
confining the background principles of Lucas to existing property and
nuisance law and by viewing such background principles as the only
1 6
defense to a total takings claim. Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States '
provides a good example. In that case, the Federal Circuit Court identified
the possible background principle defense as the only relevant issue when
a regulation deprives the owner of all economically viable use. 17 The court
subsequently described the background principles exception as limited to
restrictions of common law nuisance. It explained that "the common law of
nuisance makes unlawful certain conduct of property owners" and
characterized Lucas as allowing a state to "convert these implicit
background principles into explicit laws without thereby effecting a
taking."" 8 However, "[wihen a regulation that forbids all economically
beneficial uses of the land goes beyond these background principles.. .the
government must pay compensation. " "9

112. 727 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
113. Id. at 611, quoting Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287,291 (1984).
114. McNulty, 727 F. Supp. at 612, quoting PennsylvaniaCoal, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting).
115. See McNulty, 727 F. Supp. at 608-14.
116. 208 F.3d 1374,1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
117. Id. at 1379. The court accepted the takings framework outlined in Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). That characterization appears to confuse the
tests of Penn Central and Lucas in describing a three part analysis involving a determination
of whether there was a denial of economically viable use, an interference with distinct
investment-backed expectations and whether the interest involved was "vested in the owner,
as a matter of state property law, and not within the power of the state to regulate under
common law nuisance doctrine." See Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1379. However, the court
apparently viewed this test as applicable only in partial takings cases, since it clearly viewed
the background principle exception as the only defense to a categorical takings claim. See id.
118. Palm Beach Isles, 208 F.3d at 1383.

119. Id.
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In sum, prior to Palazzolo,notice of existing regulations was treated
in widely divergent ways. Many courts applied the so-called notice defense
using varied applications of the Penn Central and Lucas tests, while others
rejected notice as a complete bar to recovery of just compensation. The
decisions of the Supreme Court facilitated this inconsistency. The Court's
refusal to articulate clear standards certainly contributed to the problem. In
addition, the apparently opposite views adopted by the Court in Monsanto
and the Nollan footnote, with little attempt to distinguish the two, made the
Court's statements regarding notice difficult to use, allowing for further
confusion in state and lower federal courts.
DECISION OF THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Palazzolo v. State1
reflects some of the confusion found in the state and lower federal court
decisions and is a clear application of the notice defense. The court held that
the case was not ripe for review but considered the merits of the claim as an
alternative ground for its decision.121 Referring to the "undisputed
evidence" that Palazzolo could develop the upland portion of the property,
yielding a value of $200,000, the court concluded that he had not been
deprived of all economically beneficial use."2 It nonetheless asserted, "even
if Palazzolo had been denied all beneficial use of his property, he would not
be able to demonstrate a per se taking. " " Since Palazzolo did not become
the owner of the property until 1978, when the regulations at issue already
existed, the court found that the background principles exception applied,
concluding that "the right to fill the wetlands was not part of Palazzolo's
estate to begin with." 24 Therefore, the court explicitly rejected Palazzolo's
argument that "if a regulation deprives an owner of all beneficial use, it is
immaterial whether the regulation predates the claimant's ownership in the
land." 1" According to the court, such an approach would conflict with
Lucas'scommand to evaluate whether the particular use was part of the title
acquired by the claimant.'26 Furthermore, accepting Palazzolo's argument
"could lead to pernicious 'takings claims' based on speculative purchases
in which an individual intentionally purchases land, the use of which is

120.

746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).

121.
122.

Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000).

126. Id.
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severely limited by environmental restrictions,
and then seeks
' 127
compensation from the state for that 'taking."
Having found no total taking, the court considered the Penn Central
test. Again referring to the fact that the regulations were in effect at the time
Palazzolo acquired title, the court stated, "in light of these regulations,
Palazzolo could not reasonably have expected that he could fill the property
and develop a seventy-four-lot subdivision. " r"2 Finding the lack of
reasonable investment-backed expectations "dispositive" of the partial
takings 129claim, the court did not consider the other two Penn Central
factors.
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court"3 began by outlining the general framework of
takings analysis, declaring that it had given "some, but not too specific,
guidance to courts confronted with deciding whether a particular action
goes too far and effects a regulatory taking."" 1 The Court identified the
general rule of Lucas as one guideline, stating that "with certain
qualifications.. .a regulation which 'denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land' will require compensation under the Takings
Clause."' 2 When a total taking cannot be established, "a taking may
nonetheless have occurred, depending on a complex [set] of factors
including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to
which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations, and
the character of the government action.""3
After providing the background, the Court concluded that the case
was ripe for judicial review3" and then considered the merits of the takings
claim. It characterized the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court as
amounting to "a single, sweeping rule" that "[a] purchaser or a successive
title holder.. .is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and

127. Id.
128. Id. at 717.
129. Id. The decision to find notice determinative was apparently an extension of the
state's existing precedent. In Algeria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1253 (R.I. 1997), the court
declared that "prior knowledge of applicable regulations is relevant in determining whether
a claimant's investment-backed expectations were reasonable" under the Penn Central
analysis. Despite this assertion, the court considered all three of the Penn Central factors. See
id. at 1253-54.
130. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court, in which Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,

and Thomas joined. Stevens joined only in the portion of the opinion dealing with ripeness.
131. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,617 (2001).
132. Id., quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 618-26.
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is barred from claiming that it effects a taking." 35 The Court opined that
this rule was based on the notion that the state creates property rights and
can therefore "shape and define property rights and reasonable investmentbacked expectations."" 3 In response to the presumed state court theory, the
Court, though recognizing that the right to develop property is subject to
the "reasonable exercise of state authority," asserted that "[tihe State may
not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle." 137
Unreasonable regulations "do not become less so through passage of time
or title."" In the Court's view, considering post-limitation transfer of title
to be entirely determinative would allow government to, "in effect, put an
expiration on the Takings Clause."'" Such a bar would hurt future owners
as well as owners at the time of enactment who may be unable to ripen or
otherwise pursue their Takings Claim before surrendering title. 140
Expressing aversion for a rule that would allow the state to avoid paying
compensation by mere coincidence of transter of title, the Court declared
141
that "[t]he State may not by this means secure a windfall for itself."
The Court found Nollan' 4 to be "controlling precedent" for its
conclusion, observing that the dissent's notice-focused theory was rejected
in that case. 143 In addressing an assertion that Lucas "stands for the
proposition that any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a background
principle of property law which cannot be challenged by those who acquire
title after the enactment,"" the Court declared that it had had "no occasion
to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be
deemed a background principle of state law.""4 The Court instead found
it sufficient to merely recognize that "a regulation that otherwise would be

135. Id. at 626.
136. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,626 (2001).
137. Id. at 627.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.The court asserted that the owners would be "stripped of the ability to transfer the
interest which was possessed prior to the regulation." Id. It then cited Ellicskon, Property in
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,1368-69 (1993), for the proposition that the "right to transfer land is
a defining characteristic in the fee simple estate."
141. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628. The Court declared that such a rule was "capricious in
effect" and remarked that a "blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation
right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to
compensate for what is taken." Id.
142. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
143. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,629 (2001).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background
principle of the State's law by mere virtue of passage of title." 4
I The discussion of categorical takings and notice ultimately became
dicta. Like the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the
unquestioned ability of Palazzolo to build a "substantial residence" on the
upland portion of the property precluded him from establishing
deprivation of all economically beneficial use. 47 The Court subsequently
observed that the claims were not evaluated under Penn Central and
remanded the case for application of the three-factor test, stating only that
a partial takings claim "is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired
after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction."" 4
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed
that the "Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the
sweeping rule that the preacquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso
facto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction."' However,
she clarified that the "holding does not mean that the timing of the
regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the
Penn Central analysis. " 5° She asserted that "it would be just as much error
to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to
accord it exclusive significance." 5 1 According to O'Connor, the Penn Central
test always mandates a consideration of investment-backed expectations,
and "the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the
property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations." 2
She emphasized that, in contrast to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's view
that expectations are "dispositive," expectations are but "one factor that
points toward the answer to the question whether the application of a
particular regulation to particular property 'goes too far."' 15 3 Similarly, "the
state of regulatory affairs at the time of acquisition is not the only factor that
may determine the extent of investment backed expectations." 154 O'Connor
found this characterization to strike the appropriate balance because "[i]f
investment-backed expectations are given exclusive significance in the Penn
Centralanalysis and existing regulations dictate the reasonableness of those
146. Id. at 629-30.
147. Id. at 631-32. In so holding, the Court refused to consider Palazzolo's newly presented
argument that the upland portion and the wetlands portions should be considered separately.

Since the argument was not made in the state courts and was not part of the petition for
certiorari, the Court chose to consider the property as a whole. Id.

148. Id.at630.
149. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,632 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
150.

Id. at 633.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 634.

Id.
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expectations in every instance, then the State wields far too much power to
redefine property rights upon passage of title."" 5 But, "if existing
regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some property owners
may reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost.""s
Justice Scalia wrote separately on the post-regulation acquisition
issue to clarify that he did not agree with Justice O'Connor. He first
addressed O'Connor's "windfall" argument, generally downplaying the
potential problems arising when a buyer purchases property at a price
reflecting the restrictions and subsequently acquires compensation pursuant
to the Takings Clause." Even so, Scalia conceded that "[there is something
to be said (though.. .not much) for pursuing abstract 'fairness' by requiring
part or all of the windfall to be returned to the original owner." " However,
"there is nothing to be said for giving it instead to the government."" Scalia
criticized O'Connor's opinion, asserting that she "would eliminate the
windfall by giving the malefactor the benefit of its malefaction. " "6° He
ultimately concluded that "the fact that a restriction existed at the time the
purchaser took title (other than a restriction forming part of the
'background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance') should
have no bearing on the determination of whether the restriction is so
substantial as to constitute a taking,"' 6 because "[t]he 'investment-backed
expectations that the law will take into account do not include the assumed
validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value
to be unconstitutional." 162 Perhaps going further than the majority, he
asserted that "a Penn Central taking, no less than a total taking, is not
absolved by the transfer of title.""6'
Justice Stevens dissented from judgment, and particularly from the
Court's opinion on post-regulation acquisition.TM According to Stevens, a
"taking is a discrete event" that "occurs at a particular time, that time being
the moment when the relevant property interest is alienated from its
owner." 165 Since Palazzolo acquired the property after implementation of

155. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,635 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 636.
159. Id. at 636-37.
160. Id. at 637.
161. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 638-39. In a footnote, Stevens criticizes the majority for viewing a regulatory
taking differently than a "direct state appropriation," observing that "the entire rationale for
allowing compensation for regulations in the first place is the somewhat dubious proposition
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the limiting regulations, Stevens concluded that he had no standing to bring
the action, seeing Palazzolo as "simply the wrong party to be bringing the
action."" 6
Stevens found his understanding to be consistent with Nollan, based
on his view that "standing to assert a claim is determined by the impact of
the event that is alleged to have amounted to a taking rather than the sort
of notice the purchaser may or may not have received when the property
was transferred."" Although the Nollans had notice of the possible
limitation when they purchased the property, the decision of the state
agency to compel them to surrender an easement was the event that
brought the Takings Clause into effect."s According to Stevens, since the
Nollans were the owners at the time of the "triggering event," they could
bring a takings claim. In contrast, Stevens asserted that the "triggering
event" in Palazzolo could not have occurred when the Council denied
Palazzolo's application in 1986, because "[tihe title Palazzolo took by
operation of law in 1978 was limited by the regulations then in place. "1 69
Noting that he read both the complaint and the Court's opinion on the issue
of ripeness as indicating that the regulations themselves effected the alleged
taking,17° Stevens concluded that Palazzolo "acquired no more than a right
to a discretionary determination by the Council as to whether to permit him
to fill the wetlands.""'
Stevens apparently saw his interpretation as necessary to prevent
a slide down a slippery slope. He asserted that "[ijf the existence of valid
land-use regulations does not limit the title that the first postenactment
purchaser of the property inherits, then there is no reason why such
regulations should limit the rights of the second, the third, or the thirtieth
purchaser."" 7 Citing O'Connor's concurrence, Stevens indicated that in

that regulations go so 'far' as to become the functional equivalent of a direct taking." Id. at 639
n.2.
166. Id. at 641.
167. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636,643 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 643.
170. Id. at 644 n.7.
171. Id. at 644. Stevens attempted to distinguish the situations in which the decision of the
regulatory body, rather than the enactment of the regulation itself, should be considered as
the event triggering the Takings Clause. He concluded, "If the determination by the regulators
to reject the project involves such an unforeseeable interpretation or extension of the
regulation as to amount to a change in the law, then it is appropriate to consider the decision
of that body, rather than the adoption of the regulation, as the discrete event that deprived
the owner of a preexisting interestin property." Id. at 644 n.7. He also noted that if Palazzolo's
claim could appropriatelybe based on later decisions by the Council (as in Nollan),he would
not find it ripe for judicial review. Id. at 644.
172. Id. at 645.
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cases analogous to Nollan, he would treat notice of the regulation "as
relevant to the evaluation of whether the regulation goes 'too far,' but not
necessarily dispositive."'"
Justice Ginsberg also wrote a dissenting opinion. She concluded
that the case was not ripe for review but indicated in a footnote that "[i]f
Palazzolo's claims were ripe and the merits properly presented," she would
"at minimum" agree with O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer that "transfer of
title can impair a takings claim.""
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsberg that Palazzolo's claims
were not ripe for adjudication and joined in her opinion."75 Breyer
additionally mentioned that he "would agree with Justice O'Connor that the
simple fact that a piece of property has changed hands.. .does not always
automatically bar a takings claim," noting that he did not think the postregulation acquisition should determine the case. 6 According to Breyer, the
Penn Centralanalysis "much depends upon whether, or how, the timing and
circumstances of a change of ownership affect whatever reasonable
investment-backed expectations might otherwise exist."" 7 Since,
"ordinarily, such expectations will diminish in force and significance
rapidly and dramatically-as property continues to change hands over
time.. .such factors can adequately be taken into account within the Penn
Central framework.""
Breyer would apparently also not find notice or transfer of title to
be entirely controlling in the total takings context. Amid argued that
permitting "complete regulatory takings claims to survive changes in land
ownership could allow property owners to manufacture such claims by
strategically transferring property until only a nonusable portion
remains."" 7 Breyer responded by noting that he could "not see how a
constitutional provision concerned with 'fairness and justice' could reward
any such strategic behavior. " "
ANALYSIS
Perhaps most helpfully, the Court clarified the general framework
of takings analysis. The Court dearly viewed Lucas and Penn Central as
creating two entirely distinct inquiries. A regulation that denies all

173.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636,643 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

174. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

176. Id.at 654-55.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 655.
Id.
dissenting).
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636,655 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
Id. (quoting Penn Centralfor the basis in fairness and justice).
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economically beneficial use will require compensation except in situations
involving a limitation inhering in the title itself that can be characterized as
a background principle of state property or nuisance law. 8' The three-part
Penn Central test only applies "[wihere a regulation places limitation on
land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use." 82 Though
not directly relevant to notice issues, this clarification should prevent state
and lower federal courts from importing the reasonable investment-backed
expectations factor into categorical takings analysis, either as an additional
consideration or as a substitute for "background principles." At least this
should reduce the likelihood that a court will find notice of a regulation to
be determinative in the context of a per se takings claim, although as
discussed below, background principles may still provide an opening for
application of a notice defense in categorical takings cases.
What the Court specifically said regarding notice and postregulation acquisition is far less clear. The majority appears to have held
that newly enacted regulations can generally not be characterized as
"background principles" under the Lucas total takings analysis." But, the
opinion obviously leaves open the possibility that circumstances exist in
which statutes may become background principles. The Court's statement
that "a regulation that otherwise would be constitutional is not transformed
into a background principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage
of title"' implies that statutes or regulations that do not simply mirror
property or nuisance law may, at some point, become background
principles. The assertion also dearly allows for an interpretation that
passage of title is at least relevant to the determination of whether a statute
becomes a background principle. Thus, transfer of title in and of itself will
not convert a statute into a background principle capable of defeating a
Lucas-based claim, but the Court has left room for continued recognition of
a notice defense in the categorical takings context.
The concurring opinions do not fill in the gaps the majority left
regarding per se takings claims. O'Connor did not specifically address the
effect of transfer of title in the context of categorical takings. In
characterizing the majority's opinion as restoring the balance to the Penn
Centralinquiry, she did, however, advance that "[tihe temptation to adopt
what amount to perse rules in either direction must be resisted."" Stretched
to the most liberal interpretation, this statement could indicate a
disagreement with the Lucas framework itself, although the statement was

181. See id. at 617.

182. Id.
183. See id. at 629-30.
184. Id.
185. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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made with reference to Penn Central. Nonetheless, her aversion to per se
rules should, at minimum, suggest that she would not want notice or
transfer of title to conclusively defeat a total takings claim, or to be entirely
irrelevant to such a claim.
Scalia's opinion is about as vague as the majority's on the
categorical takings issue. He concluded that "the fact that a restriction
existed at the time the purchaser took title (other than a restriction forming
part of the 'background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance') should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the
restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking." s6 Whether he was
referring to background principles as defined by the majority, i.e., passage
of title is not alone sufficient but statutes or regulations not grounded in
nuisance or property law may eventually become background principles,
or to the original definition from Lucas, i.e., only existing property or
nuisance principles may defeat a total takings claim, is unclear. Since Scalia
did not want notice to factor in to the Penn Central analysis, perhaps the
most appropriate way to read his opinion is as preserving the background
principles exception of Lucas but otherwise finding limitations in effect at
the time of acquisition to be immaterial.'87
None of the dissenters discussed notice as it relates to categorical
takings in detail. Stevens' comment that he "would treat the owners' notice
as relevant to the evaluation of whether a regulation goes 'too far' but not
necessarily dispositive"M is sufficiently broad to apply in both the partial
and total takings context. The same could be said about Ginsberg's
statement that "transfer of title can impair a takings claim." 1" Breyer was
the only dissenter to speak to the issue directly but only mentioned that he
thought the Takings Clause would not permit takings claims to be created
through strategic transfer of property.)" Despite the briefness of Breyer's
discussion, his response to the arguments regarding manufactured claims
assumes that total takings could "survive changes in land ownership."19'
Given that his brief dissenting opinion advocated focusing on the
circumstances of each case,"f it is reasonable to conclude that he would not

186. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187.

Interpreting Scalia's concurrence as simply reaffirming Lucas maybe appropriate in

light of the fact that Scalia wrote that opinion. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).

188. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189.
190.

Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,655 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

191.

See id.

192. See id.at 654-55 ("I would agree with Justice O'Connor that the simple fact that a
piece of property has changed hands...does not always automatically bar a takings claim.").

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

support a rule that would make notice irrelevant in the categorical takings
context.
The absence of useful guidance regarding when and how passage
of title is relevant in the per se takings context sets the stage for further
inconsistent lower court determinations. The majority did not set any
definitive rules, instead expressing only generalized concern that a per se
rule of notice would give government too much power to interfere with
property rights." The vagueness of the concurring opinions on the
categorical takings issue will not eliminate the difficulty in applying the
majority's opinion. Furthermore, the failure of the dissenting opinions to
clearly address this point does not allow for a useful contrast. Thus, lower
courts are free to accord notice whatever significance they choose in the
categorical takings context as long as they stay within the non-restrictive
outer bounds of the majority opinion. Some courts may find only statutes
that mirror the common law of nuisance or property constitute background
principles, while others will actively consider notice and passage of title
when evaluating whether a particular statute qualifies as a background
principle.
The impact of this decision on analysis of preexisting regulations in
the partial takings context is also perplexing. Although the majority
remanded for application of the Penn Central test, it did not provide any
guidance as to the impact of notice on that inquiry. The court stated only
that the claim would not be barred "by the mere fact that the title was
acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction." " As in
the discussion of Lucas-based claims, the use of the term "mere" suggests
that post-regulation acquisition will be a pertinent but non-dispositive
factor. Presumably, passage of title following implementation of limiting
regulations should be considered when analyzing the reasonable
investment-backed expectations prong. However, O'Connor did not find
this assumption sufficiently comprehensible, given her decision to write a
darifying concurring opinion indicating that post-regulation acquisition is
an important but non-determinative factor in the Penn Central balancing
test.' 9
Scalia further complicated the issue by explicitly stating that the
"investment-backed expectations that the law will take into account do not
include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property
of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional."" Although he concurred

193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. at 626-28.
Id. at 630.
See Palazzolo v.Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 637 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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in the majority opinion and purported to disagree only with O'Connor,"
Scalia's view appears to be at odds with that of the majority. As discussed
above, the majority opinion, though certainly not unambiguous, seems to
assume that the fact that property is acquired after the effective date of the
disputed regulations will factor in to the Penn Central analysis. Scalia
apparently would not consider post-regulation acquisition to form any part
of the expectations analysis under Penn Central.
Despite the uncertainty, the majority and concurring opinions
definitively decide that notice should not be a complete bar to a partial
takings claim. Regardless of whether this fact is considered at all, or is
factored in to the Penn Central balancing test, lower courts should not be
able to use this decision in such a way as to justify finding notice of
regulations or the preexistence of regulations entirely determinative. By
implication, the opinion confirms that the expectations prong itself should
not be elevated to decisive status.'"
The dissenting opinions provide some indication of what a future
Supreme Court case addressing notice in the partial takings context might
look like. Stevens mentioned that in cases that he would find analogous to
Nolan-in which the regulations were in place at the time the owner
acquired the property but the so-called triggering event occurred at a later
time-he would agree with O'Connor, treating notice of the regulation as
relevant but not necessarily determinative.'" Breyer also concluded that
transfer of title could be part of the Penn Central analysis.' Similarly,
Ginsberg stated that she would "at minimum" agree with O'Connor,
Stevens, and Breyer that "transfer of title can impair a takings claim.""°
Thus, to the extent that Scalia's opinion is meant to advocate the irrelevance
of transfer of title to the Penn Centralanalysis, he has dearly lost.
Perhaps the specific approval of O'Connor's opinion by the
dissenters and its apparent consistency with the majority's unspoken views
will prompt lower courts to use the concurrence as guidance.' The ability

197. Id. at 636.
198. O'Connor specifically made this point. See id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring)

(expectations are but "one factor that points toward the answer to the question whether the
application of a particular regulation to particular property 'goes too far'").
199. Id. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
202. Some lower courts have already relied on O'Connor's concurrence. See, e.g., Rith

Energy v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing O'Connor's concurrence for the
proposition that Palazzolo did not hold that post-regulation purchase was irrelevant and that
the failure to consider it would be as much of an error as to elevate it to dispositive
significance); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327,1350 n.22 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (stating that O'Connor's opinion indicates that "the regulatory environment at the time
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to rely on O'Connor's concurrence may ameliorate the confusion in the Penn
Centralanalysis that will likely occur with regard to Lucas-basedclaims. Her
opinion could insure that lower courts actually weigh the ad hoc Penn
Centralfactors, instead of applying notice as an absolute bar or completely
ignoring the time of acquisition. This could potentially better effectuate the
goals of the Takings Clause. Although the government could not "put an
expiration date on the Takings Clause,"' those who were fully aware that
they would not be able to develop property, and who paid a discounted
price for it, will likely not benefit from compensation. Perhaps the existence
of "notice" or of a discounted price will then become factual issues to be
decided by the jury as opposed to presumptions automatically defeating a
takings claim.' Such an approach would be consistent with Justice Breyer's
statement that the Penn Centralanalysis "much depends.upon whether, or
how, the timing and circumstances of a change of ownership affect
whatever
reasonable investment-backed expectations might otherwise
2 05
exist."
Despite the ability to manufacture some clarity by combining the
different opinions, this case seems to have caused nearly as much confusion
as it eliminated. The only clear rules appear to be that notice of limiting
regulations should never be a complete bar to a categorical or partial
takings claim and that the government is not allowed to avoid providing
just compensation for otherwise unconstitutional action by the mere
happenstance of passage of title. In the absence of more definitive rules
regarding the impact of notice or transfer of title, lower courts are left to
treat them in essentially any way desired, so long as they do not rise to the
level of a complete bar, and perhaps, in partial takings cases, so long as
notice is at least considered.

of acquisition of the property remains both relevant and important in judging reasonable

expectations").
203. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
204. R.S. Radford and J.David Breemer characterize the existence of a discounted market
as a question of fact and point out that "Iclommentators have long understood that the
existence of investment-backed expectations, and their reasonableness, are factual issues
that... must be determined by a fact-finderweighing evidence at trial." GreatExpectations: Will

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in
Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. J.449, 527-28 (2001). At least one court has looked
favorably upon considering the actual circumstances of the case before applying a notice
defense. See Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (asserting that a notice
defense makes sense in circumstances of "actual knowledge of the government regulation

prior to purchase," because "[a] rational buyer who has actual notice of government land-use
regulations prior to purchase will consider the risk that use may be restricted when deciding
how much to pay").
205. Palazzolo,533 U.S. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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At first glance, the rejection of notice as an absolute obstruction and
the discussion of the need to avoid absolute state control over property
rights indicate a victory for private interests. But, in practice, courts that
have tended to find notice determinative in the past will likely still hold
against most takings claims involving notice or transfer of title.
Furthermore, those that have not found notice relevant are now instructed
to consider it, potentially reducing the number of successful takings claims.
The lack of clarity in the Supreme Court opinion may be a product
of a struggle with the issue of how to balance fairness and the possibility of
allowing impermissibly expansive state power. None of the justices, except
Scalia, appeared to like the idea of allowing a landowner who acquired
property with actual knowledge of existing regulations to bring a successful
takings claim. However, the Court grappled with the problem of excessive
governmental power. It simply does not seem fair for the state to
circumvent the requirements of the constitution simply because the
property changes hands. Although it is easy to imagine scenarios in which
a new purchaser will reap a substantial windfall, perhaps the more likely
circumstance is a transfer involving no consideration of a possible takings
claim, or even of the limitations on the property. It is difficult to see any
relation between transfer of title in and of itself and the state's obligation to
pay compensation. Even if the prior owner is duped into selling the
property at a low price, allowing the subsequent owner to obtain a
potentially unfair benefit by acquiring just compensation, as Scalia noted,
it is difficult to justify allowing the government to avoid payment. If the
government cannot take property without providing compensation, why
should it matter who actually receives that compensation? The Court,
though speaking strongly about excessive state power, appears to have
balanced the problem in favor of the state. It made no attempt to create a
rule making transfer of title a bar to recovery only in circumstances in
which a windfall would actually occur. Nor did it attempt to fashion a rule
that would allow the prior owner to share the proceeds of the later-brought
lawsuit. Under the Court's formulation, the government may, at some
undefined point, put an expiration date on the takings clause.
The unique facts of this case also create problems. Since Palazzolo
did not actually purchase the land, but instead acquired it upon dissolution
of a corporation, the Supreme Court could easily limit its decision to
similar facts in a later case. It is at least arguably significant that Palazzolo
did not pay a reduced price for the land based on the regulations in effect
at the time, and that he was, in a practical sense, the owner of the land when

206. The only Justice to clearly address this fact was Stevens who noted that his rule
would apply when the "transfer of ownership is the result of an arm's-length negotiation, an
inheritance, or the dissolution of a bankrupt debtor." Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

the regulations were promulgated. Although Palazzolo was not technically
the owner of the land until the corporation dissolved, his expectations were
probably formed much earlier. It may accordingly make sense that the effect
of the regulations should not have an impact on this case. The Court
apparently did not find these factors to be particularly noteworthy and did
not limit its holding with regard to them. In fact, it remanded for the Penn
Central analysis without speculating as to the likely success or failure of
Palazzolo's claim. Despite the Court's decision not to place emphasis on the
facts of this case, its unique posture may make it particularly worthy of
distinction in the lower courts. Perhaps in situations of mutual exchange
(such as a traditional sale of the property), transfer of title will consistently
be found to completely bar a takings claim. This could make the possible
victory for private property rights appear even more hollow.
Following Palazzolo, a few courts have already utilized a more
watered-down version of the notice defense, emphasizing that the case does
not make notice or transfer of title irrelevant. In addressing a motion for
reconsideration in Sanderson v. Town of CandiaY the New Hampshire
Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's assertion that it had rejected the
takings claim based solely on notice, stating that it had "considered that
factor significant, but not dispositive."m Similarly, in Daniel v. County of
Santa Barbara,29 the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Palazzolo
"rejected the state court's 'blanket rule' that would have found no taking
whenever a purchaser was aware of the existing land-use regulations that
reduced the market value of property" but "did not adopt the converse of
that rule."21 It criticized a tenet that would not require a consideration of
notice or transfer of title, describing such a rule as permitting new
purchasers to bring a takings claim, "even if there had been a taking for
which the prior owner had already been compensated; if the prior owner
had already litigated and lost a takings challenge to that restriction; or if the
prior owner had allowed application limitations periods to lapse without
creating a ripe takings claim or challenging an already-ripe claim." 2
Yet, other courts appear to have read Palazzoloas entirely rejecting
the notice defense. For example, in State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield
Heights,212 the Supreme Court of Ohio quoted extensively from Palazzolo""
to support its conclusion that a limitation in existence prior to the plaintiffs'

207. 787 A.2d 167 (N.H. 2002).
208. Id. at 171. The court cited O'Connor's concurrence as authority for its treatment of
notice as relevant but not determinative. See id.
209.

288 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 2002).

210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 384.
Id.
765 N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002).
Id. at 352.
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acquisition would not preclude the finding of a taking.2 14 The court asserted
that "the Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument that a
purchaser or a successive title holder is deemed to have notice of an earlierenacted land restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a
taking." 21s A Florida court similarly construed Palazzolo in Rukab v. City of
Jacksonville Beach,216 stating that "the United States Supreme Court
determined that purchasers of property subject to state regulation were not
precluded from raising a claim of a regulatory taking even if they were
aware of the regulation at the time they purchased the property."217
Perhaps the existence of varied decisions following Palazzolo
indicates that it will not amount to. a victory for either public or private
interests. However, the result will probably not be one of balance, but
instead one of more confusion. While the opinion has certainly cleared up
some issues regarding notice (and will hopefully put the Lucas/PennCentral
commingling to rest), it appears that the Supreme Court will have to
address problems of notice again if consistency in state and lower federal
courts is to be achieved.

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 811 So. 2d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
217. Id. at 733. The court then applied this rule in a direct (as opposed to inverse)
condemnation action. Id.

